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Problem area 
The aviation community expects 
the volume of air traffic over 
Europe to double within the next 
15 years or so, without 
jeopardising high safety records 
of aviation. Such safe increase of 
volume requires challenging 
developments in air transport 
operations and their 
management, with possibly 
changing stakeholder 
responsibilities.  
 
According to regulations posed 
by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation, the 
national authorities are 
responsible for the safety within 
their country’s airspace. Hence, 
before a change in air transport 
can become operational, the 
national authorities will require 
ensuring that the targeted 
operation is safe, that it will 
remain safe during an applicable 
period, and that any issues that 
may compromise safety are 
mitigated. The process to ensure 
this is referred to as Safety 
Validation.  
 
Objectives 
The objective of this paper is to 
develop a safety validation 
framework that emphasises the 
active roles that have to be 
played by the multiple 
stakeholders during the 
development phases of a major 
change in air transport 
operations. The development of 
this safety validation framework 
is referred to as SAFMAC (SAFety 
validation of MAjor Changes). 
 
The appropriate safety validation 
of a drastic change in air 
transport operations is very 
challenging. Since a new 
operation design in air transport 
potentially creates emergent 
behaviour, an appropriate safety 
validation approach should 
identify and analyse both known 
and yet unknown behaviours. 
The approach should be able to 
address advanced concepts of 
operations in a wide context, 
such as an airspace with several 
airports, including approach and 
departure procedures, air 
transport routes, separation 
criteria, system performance, 
with inclusion of institutional, 
organisational and human 
aspects and with attention to 
integral aircraft/ground aspects. 
A complicating aspect is that air 
traffic operations are 
characterised by a large number 
of diverse stakeholders involved, 
for which responsibilities are 
likely to change. The challenging 
developments in air transport 
operations can only become 
effective with a timely and 
adequate involvement of all 
these stakeholders, and by 
proper aligning with other 
international air transport 
developments. What appears to 
be missing is guidelines on 
when and how to involve the 
various stakeholders in the 
development process, and to 
take into account the necessary 
alignment of their 
responsibilities and their goals. 
 
Description of work 
This paper first explains what 
we mean by air transport 
operations and concept of 
operations, and gives a taste of 
the numbers and the diversity of 
the stakeholders involved. Next, 
it presents single-stakeholder 
validation views from literature 
and analyses these views 
regarding issues which need to 
be addressed when developing 
major changes in air transport 
operations. Subsequently, the 
paper outlines multi-stakeholder 
validation views from literature, 
and analyses whether these 
address the open issues relevant 
for air transport operations. 
After this, the strong points of 
all validation views are collected 
and integrated into one 
framework. This framework 
includes a Macro stage, in which 
all stakeholders work together 
on their joint goal, which is 
followed by a Meso stage in 
which each stakeholder works 
on their individual requirements 
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in line with the joint goal. 
Finally, this framework is 
elaborated for the early concept 
development phases. 
 
Results and conclusions 
Through a process of analysis, 
evaluation, review and 
consolidation, including an 
alignment with important 
European developments in the 
field, this paper develops a 
safety validation framework that 
consists of four processes: Joint 
goal setting by all stakeholders; 
CONOPS development; Joint 
safety validation process; 
Allocation of responsibilities and 
requirements (possibly including 
functionalities and information 
flow developments and 
validation responsibilities), to 
appropriate individual 
stakeholders. The framework is 
referred to as SAFMAC (SAFety 
validation of MAjor Changes). 
 
In order to further these results, 
the SAFMAC developments will 
be focused along two tracks: a 
policy track, and a follow-up 
study track. The policy track 
aims for obtaining further 
acceptance, nationally, within 
Europe, within the USA, and 
within ICAO.  
 
The main issues to be addressed 
in the follow-up study track are: 
• Further clarifying the roles 
and responsibilities of the 
different stakeholders within 
the process of developing a 
safety validated CONOPS. In 
particular, attention should 
be paid to the role of the 
regulator and the 
supervisory authorities, 
including the need for 
missing regulations.  
• Development of a set of 
safety validation quality 
indicators. 
• Embedding of safety 
methods into the safety 
validation process, and 
further development of 
safety validation process, 
including mapping to the 
individual stakeholders. 
• Application of the framework 
to one or more interesting 
(national) major changes in 
air transport operations.  
 
A first national application has 
been started for a project on 
merging civil and military 
airspace management. The early 
experience in this project 
already shows that thinking 
about joint goal setting works 
remarkably refreshingly for the 
participating stakeholders and 
causes them to look beyond 
their own familiar contexts. 
 
Ongoing developments 
regarding the identified 
validation views and newly 
emerging validation views will 
be considered in the further 
SAFMAC development as well. 
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ABSTRACT 
The high volume of air traffic over Europe is expected to double within the next 
15 years. This requires changes in the airspace structure and in the organisation 
of air transport operations that involve multiple stakeholders. Changes, by 
regulation, require a sufficient safety validation, in order to show that the 
changed situation is safe and will remain safe during an applicable period. Many 
methods and techniques exist that can be used to support such safety validation 
process. However, for air transport operations, the stakeholders involved are 
numerous and diverse, and there are no guidelines on how to address their roles, 
responsibilities and goals during development and validation.  
 
This paper develops a safety validation framework that emphasises the active 
roles and collaboration of multiple stakeholders during the development phases 
of air transport operations. The framework is developed in three steps: First, 
established validation views from literature are identified and analysed to reveal 
open issues when it comes to their use for multi-stakeholder changes in air 
transport operations. Next, validation views emerging beyond the established 
ones are identified, and evaluated on whether they address the open issues. 
Finally, the strong points of established and emerging views are combined into a 
novel framework. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The aviation community expects the volume of air traffic over Europe to double 
within the next 15 years or so (SESAR, 2007), without jeopardising high safety 
records of aviation. Such safe increase of volume requires challenging 
developments in air transport operations and their management, with possibly 
changing stakeholder responsibilities.  
 
According to regulations posed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO Annex 11), the national authorities are responsible for the safety within 
their country’s airspace. Hence, before a change in air transport can become 
operational, the national authorities will require ensuring that the targeted 
operation is safe, that it will remain safe during an applicable period, and that 
any issues that may compromise safety are mitigated. The process to ensure this 
is referred to as Safety Validation. The use of the term validation is in line with 
the common definition of ‘validation’, as answering the question “are we building 
the right system?”, as opposed to ‘verification’, which is defined as answering the 
question “are we building the system right?”  
 
The objective of this paper is to address this problem by developing a safety 
validation framework that emphasises the active roles that have to be played by 
the multiple stakeholders during the development phases of a major change in 
air transport operations. The development of this safety validation framework 
started in (Everdij et al., 2006) and is referred to as SAFMAC (SAFety validation of 
MAjor Changes). 
 
The appropriate safety validation of a drastic change in air transport operations 
is very challenging. Since a new operation design in air transport potentially 
creates emergent behaviour, e.g. (Shah et al., 2005), an appropriate safety 
validation approach should identify and analyse both known and yet unknown 
behaviours. The approach should be able to address advanced concepts of 
operations in a wide context, such as an airspace with several airports, including 
approach and departure procedures, air transport routes, separation criteria, 
system performance, with inclusion of institutional, organisational and human 
aspects and with attention to integral aircraft/ground aspects. A complicating 
aspect is that air traffic operations are characterised by a large number of diverse 
stakeholders involved, for which responsibilities are likely to change. The 
challenging developments in air transport operations can only become effective 
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with a timely and adequate involvement of all these stakeholders, and by proper 
aligning with other international air transport developments. What appears to be 
missing is guidelines on when and how to involve the various stakeholders in the 
development process, and to take into account the necessary alignment of their 
responsibilities and their goals. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains what we mean by air 
transport operations and concept of operations, and gives a taste of the numbers 
and the diversity of the stakeholders involved. Section 3 presents single-
stakeholder validation views from literature and analyses these views regarding 
issues which need to be addressed when developing major changes in air 
transport operations. Section 4 outlines multi-stakeholder validation views from 
literature, and analyses whether these address the open issues relevant for air 
transport operations. Section 5 integrates the strong points of all validation 
views collected into one framework. This framework includes a Macro stage, in 
which all stakeholders work together on their joint goal, which is followed by a 
Meso stage in which each stakeholder works on their individual requirements in 
line with the joint goal. Section 6 provides an elaboration of this framework for 
the early concept development phases. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.  
 
 
2 AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONS AND THEIR 
STAKEHOLDERS 
In this paper, ‘air transport operations’ refers to the set of all air transport 
movements in the airspace that have the intention to transport passengers 
and/or goods, with support from all infrastructure and services that are 
necessary to establish these movements in an efficient and safe way. All 
together, it forms a large joint cognitive system (Hollnagel and Woods, 2005). A 
concept of operations (CONOPS) is a description on how these air transport 
operations are proposed to be organised and managed in a safe and effective 
way. It outlines the roles and responsibilities of all operators, the procedures and 
the functions of the technical systems, and their interactions. A CONOPS is 
generally designed and developed in several iterative phases, and the sequence 
of phases from the beginning to the end is referred to as the lifecycle.  
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In air transport, such CONOPS development requires adequate involvement of 
various stakeholders. The number of stakeholders involved in or affected by a 
major change in air transport operations is very large. Fig. 1 gives an overview 
which divides them into groups, and with a few example stakeholders per group 
indicated. Note that some stakeholders may fall under two or more groups; for 
others, the choice of group may be argued, and it may also be argued if 
governments are stakeholders or organisations beyond the stakeholders. 
However, the overview in Fig. 1 may paint a good first picture of their variety and 
of the consequential complexity of designing a CONOPS of advanced air transport 
operations.  
 
AIR TRANSPORT
 MANUFACT-
URERS
OTHER
REGU-
LATORS
POLICY 
MAKERS
ANSPs
AIRPORTS
AIRSPACE 
USERS
- Airlines
- Military
- General aviation
- Charter carriers
- ...
- Airports national
- Airports regional
- ...
- Ministry of transport
- Ministry of defence
- European Commission
- Eurocontrol HQ
- ...
- NSA
- EASA
- CAA
- JAA
- ICAO
- ...
- National ANSPs
- MUAC
- ASM
- ATFM
- ATS
- ...
HUMAN
SOCIETY
OTHER SERVICE
PROVIDERS
HUMAN 
OPERATORS
- Passengers
- Neighbours
- Municipalities
- Environmental movements
- ...
- Maintenance
- AIS
- MET
- ...
- Aircraft manuf.
- Aeronautics
- Supply industry
- ...
- ATCo
- Pilot
- ...
ASSOCIATIONS
- AEA
- ERA
- IATA
- IFALPA
- IFATCA
- CANS
- ACI Europe
- ...
- University
- Consultant
- Research
- Publishers
- Insurance
- Committees 
- ...
 
Figure 1: Overview of stakeholders in air transport operations. The explanation of the 
abbreviated organisation names falls beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
It is also interesting to identify the relation with potential victims of accidents. 
First party victims are aircraft crews involved in the accident, who typically are 
employed by an airspace user, e.g. an airline. Second party victims are 
passengers aboard an unlucky aircraft. Third party victims are any human victims 
outside the unlucky aircraft, e.g. victims that happened to be at the aircraft crash 
site. Thus, first, second and third party victims fall within a few stakeholder types 
only. Their future safety critically depends of a proper conops design.   
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2008-425 
January 2009  9 
 
3 SINGLE-STAKEHOLDER VALIDATION VIEWS 
The lifecycle of an air transport operation is a stepwise description of the 
evolution of the operation. The lifecycle of future operations starts with the 
formulation of the Mission and of Strategic Objectives by stakeholders. The 
lifecycle ends after the economical life span of the operation. Obviously a 
lifecycle consists of many phases and subphases. In order to keep things 
manageable throughout the lifecycle, two things should be arranged: for each 
subphase the responsible actor(s) should be identified, and it must be possible 
to assess in an objective way if a particular subphase is completed. The latter 
assessment steps are commonly referred to as validation and verification steps. 
Since validation deals with examining the question if the right system is being 
developed, validation itself depends on the one hand on the actor groups and on 
the other hand on the phase of the lifecycle of the system. 
 
In various fields, people are designing and building systems, which includes 
proving that the right system is being built (validation) and that the system is 
being built right (verification). For complex systems there is a clear need for a 
structured approach towards validation and verification throughout the complete 
lifecycle of the system. Consequently, a pile of literature is available on 
verification and validation. While verification is always seen as comparing the 
outputs of some system development phase with the inputs it received from an 
earlier phase, various differing interpretations of validation appear in literature. 
The simple reason is that the interpretation depends on the people to which one 
poses the validation question “are we building the right system?” The aim of this 
section is to give a brief literature overview of established validation views. It 
appears that these all address a single stakeholder only. The section uses input 
from Blom et al., (1996). 
 
3.1 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT MODELS 
For complex systems, there are two basic system development models known in 
the literature: the V-model and the Spiral model. They give complementary views 
to the development of a system. Consequently, in practice these two models are 
often used in a combination. They are briefly explained next. 
 
The V-model can be seen as a refinement of the ‘waterfall model’. In the waterfall 
model, system developments are done sequentially so that there are clean 
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phases which do not repeat processes carried out in previous phases; the 
outputs of one phase form the input of the next. However, in the case of 
complex developments which must be heavily decomposed for design and 
production, it is often necessary to check that the outputs of one stage are 
verified against the specifications at the input, and furthermore that those 
outputs meet the requirements of the real world application. This leads to the V-
model, Fig. 2, with the left-hand-side of the V representing refinement of the 
specification (i.e. of the waterfall model) and the right-hand-side of the V 
representing production and assemblage. The correctness of each step is verified 
before proceeding to the next, whilst validation of the refinement “specifications” 
against the “productions” is effected across multiple design phases as shown in 
the diagram.  
 
A standard safety-directed development approach established in aviation is the 
SAE’s (Society of Automotive Engineers) Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP 
4754, ARP 4761). Like the V-model, this approach is based on the notion of 
hierarchical system decomposition during development. It contains processes for 
requirements capture, validation, system development and verification, and gives 
guidelines and methods for conducting the safety assessment process on civil 
airborne systems and equipment. 
 
Requirements
Specification
Architectural
Design
Detailed
Design
Implementation
& Unit Test
Integration
Testing
System
Testing
Specification
Design
Component 
Design
Tested 
Units
Integrated 
System
Tested
System
Validation
Validation
Validation
Project Management
Quality
Assurance
Quality 
Assurance
Acceptance
Testing
 
Figure 2: The V lifecycle model, e.g. (Whytock, 1993). 
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The spiral model is based on the premise that not all events that may arise 
during complex developments can be foreseen from the onset. When unforeseen 
events happen, steps in the development strategy and plan are adjusted, with 
obvious effects on target end-dates and confidence in the final outcome. By 
iterating through requirements-specification-design-implementation stages and 
progressively refining the solution, the risk can be evaluated and quantified. In 
the spiral model (Fig. 3) each cycle progressively comes closer to the eventual 
solution. The model includes the possibility of change within the development 
processes. This risk-driven approach recognises that unpredictable events may 
occur and provides a strategy for their timely discovery and handling. The cyclic 
iterations in the spiral allow the selection from options and optimisation by 
gradual incremental change. A segment projected from the centre of the spiral 
embraces the same processes across the iterations. Thus the spiral model is 
similar to a repeated waterfall model. The inner cycles represent early analysis 
and prototyping techniques; the outer cycles embrace development techniques. 
A segment of each spiral is devoted to risk analysis to decide if and when 
sufficient cycles have been undertaken. 
 
Cumulative Cost
Progress through stages
Evaluate alternatives, Identify and resolve risksDetermine objectives, Alternatives, Constraints
analysis
analysis
risk
analysis
risk
risk
life cycle
plan
development
plan
integration
& testplan
review
partition
requirements
validation
design
requirements
validation
develop & verify
next level product
models
benchmarks
proto
type
proto
type 2
proto
type 3
operational
prototype
develop
prototype
system
design
detailed
design
lations
simu-
develop, and verify
next level process plans
evaluate process alternatives;
identify and resolve process risks
determine process objectives
alternatives and constraints
Figure 3: The spiral lifecycle model, e.g. (Whytock, 1993). 
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Both in the V-model and in the Spiral model we recognize that the verification 
and validation steps play a crucial role in deciding if a particular phase is 
completed or not. Neither of these two development models, however, provides 
details about their verification and validation steps. As such it is of crucial 
importance to understand the literature views on verification and validation when 
one goes into a detailed elaboration of very complex developments.  
 
3.2 SYSTEM ENGINEERING VIEWS ON VALIDATION 
With the V-model we actually came across a particular interpretation of 
validation: comparing the output of subsequent development phases against the 
specifications at the beginning of these development phases. In this case the 
question “are we building the right system?” obviously has been posed to people 
who are responsible for delivering an integrated system according to the 
specifications. What is missing in that case is the validation of those initial 
specifications. Obviously, it is quite well possible to extend the V-model with 
validation steps which handle these omissions.  
 
Another common situation is that the validation question is posed to people who 
are designing the system, in which case we arrive at the view held in software 
engineering (Deutsch, 1982, p. 8): validation is a matter of comparing a result 
against user requirements. Fig. 4 shows the resulting phase-wise verification and 
across-phase validation efforts (Sage, 1992, p. 136). What is missing in that case 
is the validation of the user requirements themselves. 
 
Requirements
Specifications
Preliminary
Conceptual
Design
Logical Design
& Architectural
Specifications
Detailed
Design and
Testing
Operational 
Implementation
Operational
Deployment
Evaluation and
Modification
Validation
Verification
 
Figure 4: System designer's view on verification of validation (Sage, 1992, p. 136). 
 
Another interpretation of validation comes when posing the question “are we 
building the right system?” to customer-oriented designers. In that case 
validation stands for comparing a design result with the “stated or implied user 
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needs”, e.g. (Roes, 1993, p. 208) Fig. 5. This pre-assumes that the “stated or 
implied user needs” are flawless. It is left to the customer to validate the “stated 
or implied user needs”. 
 
Validation Verification
Stated or implied needs
Requirements
Design
Implementation
Integration
 
Figure 5: Customer-oriented view on verification/validation (Roes, 1993, p. 208). 
 
From studies on dependable computing and fault-tolerant systems, e.g. (Randell 
et al., 1995), it has become clear that the basic validation question “are we 
building the right system?” should be followed by the additional validation 
question “and for how long will it be right?” This additional validation question 
takes into account that the user needs may evolve with time, and that the 
economic life is limited.  
 
3.3 HUMAN FACTORS VIEW ON VALIDATION IN SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
Like for system development, different development models can be identified for 
the side of the human. The characteristic of a psychological model for the human 
side is that it pays more attention to the human in connection to their 
responsibilities, rather than the system engineering approach of considering the 
human operator simply as another sub-system. An example can be seen in Fig. 6 
(Stubler et al., 1993), where the model starts from a mission statement and takes 
into account possible errors and cognitive demands of the human as well as 
human-system aspects to test the concept before starting the actual validation 
and verification process. 
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Mission statement
Performance req'nts:
- System
- Human
Functional req'nts:
- Individual M-MIS 
   features
- Integrated system
Individual / partially
integrated M-MIS
hardware prototypes
Integrated M-MIS 
hardware prototype
M-MIS breadboard
designs
Part-task
simulators
Full-scope
simulator
Design 
process
Evaluation
Testbed
Concept testing Acceptance testing
Analysis of important operator
activities: Cognitive demands
and sources of error
Human factors / cognitive
science principles for
M-MIS design
Human factors / cognitive science
principles for analytical and
experimental evaluations
Model of human
performance
Research to guide
M-MIS concept
development
Studies to
Refine M-MIS 
concepts
Verification
Validation
Verification
Validation
 
Figure 6: Development from human factors point of view (Stubler et al., 1993). M-MIS 
denotes man-machine interface system.  
 
There are other human development models, e.g. (Plant, 1993, p. 201; Westrum, 
1993, p. 409; Jackson, 1989), which all have in common that the validation 
question “are we building the right system?” is posed to a human factors expert 
rather than a system designer. Similar as for system engineering, there are 
multiple human factors interpretations of the validation question possible. For 
example if we put the validation question both to a human factors designer of 
human machine interfaces and to a developer of human centred automation 
strategies, then we will get quite different answers. A good impression of the 
large variety in human factors interpretations of validation can be found in Wise 
et al. (1993). 
 
3.4 BUSINESS MANAGEMENT VIEW ON VALIDATION 
Usually the management of the lifecycle of a system is not an objective that 
stands on its own. From a business need perspective the objective is rather to 
best ensure market competitiveness through a cost-effective handling of all 
elements and factors involved with the products under consideration (e.g. 
customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, robust design, variability 
reduction, statistical thinking, management responsibility, supplier integration, 
quality control, education and worker training, teamwork, cultural change and 
stakeholder interfaces). Basically it is a business need of improving the product 
which makes it worthwhile to invest in a new system. Thus from a business need 
perspective, the common validation question “are we building the right system?” 
is only part of the more general validation question “are we designing and 
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planning for the right product, and for how long?”. This generalised validation 
question has two important implications: 
 
1. Insufficient validation and verification during the early phases of a design of 
a new production system may undermine a cost-effective lifecycle, since the 
farther a production facility progressed in the design process, the more 
costly the modifications will become since one change has all sorts of 
implications that impose the need for yet other changes. 
2. Validation and verification of a new production system does not stop when 
production starts, but continues throughout the productive stage of its 
lifecycle.  
 
A well known approach in organizing these business-directed validation and 
verification steps, both during development and operational phases, is known as 
Total Quality Management (TQM). TQM realizes strategic management for quality 
consciousness and assurance at four levels (Sage, 1992, p. 191): 
 
• Inspected quality, to assess if performance satisfies pre-specified norms. 
• Statistically controlled quality, using cost-effective performance metrics. 
• Quality built-in through design and planning at operational task level. 
• Proactively managed quality, through the involvement of all organizational 
elements involved in the process and products under consideration. 
 
All four levels ask for verification and validation steps. At the first three levels the 
generalised validation question “are we designing and planning for the right 
system?” is dealt with by the management only. At the fourth level, however, this 
question is dealt with by all entities participating in the production. If the latter 
level is being omitted, then we speak of Quality Management. Thus the 
involvement of all entities at the fourth level is specific to TQM. 
 
Implicitly, quality incorporates safety. Nevertheless, in safety related business 
one sometimes refers to TQSM (Total Quality and Safety Management) in order to 
clarify that safety consciousness and assurance should explicitly be incorporated 
at the four levels identified: 
 
• Inspected quality and safety, to assess if quality and safety satisfies pre-
specified norms. 
• Statistically controlled quality and safety, using cost-effective performance 
metrics. 
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• Quality and safety built-in through design and planning at operational task 
level. 
• Proactively managed quality and safety, through the involvement of all 
organizational elements involved in the process and products under 
consideration. 
 
A further elaboration of TQM has been done by EFQM (European Foundation of 
Quality Management) and resulted in the EFQM (EFQM, 2002), which embeds the 
principles of excellence in a framework that helps organizations assess their 
capabilities and strengths in order to achieve their particular goals Fig. 7. 
 
Leadership
People
Partnerships
& Resources
Processes
People Results
Society Results
Key
Performance
Results
ENABLERS RESULTS
INNOVATION AND LEARNING
Policy &
Strategy
Customer Results
 
Figure 7: EQFM model. 
 
3.5 SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND MODERN SAFETY CASE 
The safety validation of a safety-critical operation is documented in a Safety 
Case, which is a series of documents describing the results of a safety validation 
process. The Safety Case thinking has evolved in parallel with the safety 
management and certification thinking. The original certification regime for an 
operator of, e.g. an offshore petrochemical plant posed requirements to the 
systems, procedures and crew, which were of a prescriptive nature. To put a new 
or changed petrochemical plant into operation, the operator of that plant had to 
build a Safety Case for approval by the national authorities. This Safety Case had 
to provide the high level arguments and the supporting evidence that for each 
normal and failure mode of that plant, the combination of frequency of 
occurrence and severity of effects was acceptable. 
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During the last two decades, the safety management and certification thinking 
has rapidly evolved by positive experiences in safety-critical domains. It was the 
report by Cullen (1990) on the Piper-Alpha accident of 1988 that made clear that 
for complex safety critical operations in the petrochemical industry, there was a 
need to introduce two major improvements: (1) replace the prescriptive 
certification requirements by goal-setting ones (e.g. in terms of risk), and (2) 
implement appropriate safety feedback loops at all management levels (Andlauer 
et al., 1999). This goal-oriented safety management depicted in Fig. 8 shows that 
goal setting is an iterative process in itself, even when restricting to a single 
stakeholder. However, it does address the validation of actor requirements, i.e. 
making sure that the identified actor requirements, wishes or needs are all 
consistent with the goals of the design. 
 
Set goals
Check against goals
Do to meet plan
Plan to meet goals
Feedback to "Set goals" and "Plan"
 
Figure 8: Goal-oriented Safety Management process. 
 
Under a classical prescriptive regime, a Safety Case tends to provide an 
instantaneous picture of the possible failure modes and their effects. Under a 
modern goal-setting safety management regime, the scope of a Safety Case is 
much wider: (1) it is aimed to cover anything that may influence safety, e.g. all 
hazards but also all positive safety behaviours rather than failure modes only 
(Fowler et al., 2007), and (2) it takes the impact of the safety management 
approach of the responsible actors into account. Thus, a Modern Safety Case 
incorporates the elements of a classical safety case, plus a description of the 
safety management approach and a hazard register, see Fig. 9.  
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Figure 9: Modern Safety Case under goal-setting safety management. 
 
A complementary development is that top level management has recognised the 
Modern Safety Case as a valuable decision-support management tool during all 
lifecycle stages of a safety critical operation (e.g. Short, 1998). For example, 
during the conceptual development stage of a new safety critical operation, top 
level management may have to make a decision with respect to further improving 
the design first, or starting the preparation and procurement for the operational 
implementation of a new or improved operation. In order to be fully informed, 
top level management rather needs the complete picture provided by a Modern 
Safety Case, than the partial picture provided by several technical evaluations. A 
related development is that, for a safety-critical operation, insurance companies 
reduce the insurance premium if a Modern Safety Case is available, e.g. in 
petrochemical industry. 
 
3.6 ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-STAKEHOLDER VALIDATION VIEWS 
Finally, we analyse the established validation views presented in this section. 
Here we start with the good news: these views are all well established for the 
design of technical systems in aviation, and a lot of practical experience exists 
with their application to a variety of problems. In particular, the Aerospace 
Recommended Practices (ARP) of the Society of Automotive Engineers are 
considered a standard for the development of civil airborne systems and 
equipment (ARP 4754, ARP 4761). Each of the established validation views 
highlights issues important for particular stakeholders. 
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When considering validation of major changes in air transport operations, also 
several questions can be posed regarding the established views. Below, these 
questions are referred to as issues A-D: 
 
A. Are multiple stakeholders addressed? There are many different stakeholders 
involved in air transport operations; e.g., Airspace users, Human society, 
Regulatory and supervisory authorities, Policy makers, Air Navigation Service 
Providers, Airports, Manufacturers, Human operators, etc. Each of these 
groups of stakeholders has its own goals, and each will have their influence 
on future air transport operations. None of the established validation views 
address the development process for more than one stakeholder.  
B. Is integration with complementary views addressed? For major changes in air 
transport operations, different validation aspects need to be addressed. 
Safety aspects often require other validation perspectives than economy or 
human factors aspects. These aspects should eventually be balanced and 
integrated. For none of the established validation views it is explained how it 
can be integrated with any of the other views. A related issue is that the 
established validation views do not acknowledge the same phases in the 
operation’s development lifecycle. 
C. Is joint validation of multiple actors requirements addressed? The goal-
oriented safety management process described in Section 3.5 asked if the 
requirements of an individual stakeholder are validated with respect to the 
goal of this stakeholder. Due to the high complexity of air traffic 
management and the multiple stakeholders vested interests, in practice it is 
even more demanding to set joint goals for all stakeholders together, let 
alone start with requirements that are validated against the joint goal setting. 
None of the established views handle this. 
D. Is the role of government policy makers taken into account? Government 
forms a special stakeholder. In addition to being one of the stakeholders of 
the previous issues A and C, it has a role as visionary policy maker for its 
people. For major changes in air transport operations, the role of the policy 
maker is of particular relevance due to the part they play as investors in 
infrastructure and in coordinating with neighbouring countries. In some 
situations (e.g. as in the Netherlands), the policy maker is also the national 
regulator, who has a special additional role in major changes. None of the 
established validation views addresses this; the only elements that are 
arranged are the certifying authorities, but these have no role to play in the 
economic judgement.  
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4 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER VALIDATION VIEWS 
This section presents some validation views from literature, which are considered 
to go beyond the established ones, and analyses if they address the main open 
issues A-D. 
4.1 EUROPEAN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT VALIDATION METHODOLOGY 
(E-OCVM) 
A lack of clear and understandable information to support decision making on air 
traffic management system implementation in the mid 1990s motivated 
validation research in Europe. The project VAPORETO (Validation Process for 
Overall Requirements in Air transport operations) (Blom et al., 1996) laid the 
foundation: in this project, most of the established validation views of Section 3 
were identified and several shortcomings were revealed. The European 
Commission provided continuous support for addressing this (Fassert et al., 
1998) and brought together industry, research and development (R&D) 
organisations, and service providers. From this point onwards, through a 
sequence of other projects (e.g. CAVA, Concerted Action on Validation of Air 
traffic management systems; MAEVA, Master Air traffic management European 
Validation plan) the findings were eventually converged into the European 
Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) (E-OCVM, 2007). 
 
E-OCVM includes three aspects of validation that, when viewed together, help 
provide structure to an iterative and incremental approach to concept 
development and concept validation: (1) The Concept Lifecycle Model facilitates 
the setting of appropriate validation objectives and the choice of evaluation 
techniques, shows how concept validation interfaces with product development 
and indicates where requirements should be determined; (2) The Structured 
Planning Framework facilitates programme planning and transparency of the 
whole process; (3) The Case-Based Approach integrates many evaluation exercise 
results into key ‘cases’ (safety case, business case, environment case, human 
factors case) that address stakeholder issues about air traffic management (ATM) 
performance and behaviours. These three aspects fit together to form a process. 
This process is focused on developing a concept towards an application while 
demonstrating to key stakeholders how to achieve an end system that is fit for 
purpose. The Concept Lifecycle is the central aspect of the validation process, 
see Fig. 10. Note that the case based approach within E-OCVM is under further 
development in (CAATS II, 2006). 
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V1   V2   V3   V0   V4   V5   
ATM needs Scope Feasibility Integration Pre-Operational Operational
ImplementationIndustrialisation
and approval
Build,
consolidate
and test
Iteratively develop and
evaluate concept
Scope Operational
Concept and develop
Validation Plans
Gather and assess
ATM Performance
Needs
Focus of E-OCVM
Idea Implemented
Concept
Figure 10: E-OCVM Concept lifecycle model, from E-OCVM (2007). 
 
The six phases of the Concept Lifecycle Model are: 
 
• V0 ATM Needs – The ATM performance needs and barriers must be 
identified. The concept must show that it can alleviate these barriers enough 
thus enhancing ATM performance to the anticipated required level. 
• V1 Scope – The concept should be described in sufficient detail to enable 
identification of the potential benefits mechanism. Unknown or unclear 
aspects of the concept may exist as a number of options to be assessed 
during the further validation process. 
• V2 Feasibility – The concept is developed and explored until it can be 
considered operationally feasible. During this phase, system prototypes will 
be used that make assumptions about technical aspects in order to avoid 
system engineering which can be costly and lengthy. Aspects that should be 
focused on are operability and the acceptability of operational aspects. 
Operational procedures and requirements should become stable and be 
thoroughly tested.  
• V3 Integration – Any required functionality is integrated into pre-industrial 
prototypes, by using realistic scenarios that are representative of what the 
concept must be able to manage. The focus is therefore on system level 
behaviour, performance and establishment of standards/regulations 
necessary to build and operate the required technical infrastructure.  
• V4 Pre-Operational – Pre-operational prototypes will be transformed into 
industrial products ready for implementation and all institutional issues 
concerned with procedures approval should be addressed.  
• V5 Implementation – This is the phase when products and procedures are 
combined to create an operational system.  
E-OCVM (2007) integrates several complementary established validation views 
(issue B in Section 3.6). In particular, it addresses multiple validation aspects by 
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combining three different approaches, i.e. (1) The concept lifecycle model, (2) the 
structured planning framework, and (3) the case-based approach. In addition, it 
identifies the need to integrate views within these approaches, e.g. from safety 
case, business case, environment case, human factors case, etc. Regarding the 
issue of multiple stakeholder roles (issue A in Section 3.6), the E-OCVM explicitly 
includes steps that identify the multiple stakeholders involved, and that identify 
the objectives and needs of each of the stakeholders. Subsequently, it uses the 
requirements of the individual stakeholders to develop a validation strategy, 
which is regularly reviewed and updated. E-OCVM however does not explicitly 
address how the requirements of different stakeholders are being balanced and 
does not explicitly address the joint validation of stakeholder requirements 
(issue C); implicitly it is expected that regular reviews and updates would be 
sufficient. Policy makers (issue D) are implicitly addressed as one of the 
stakeholders involved, but their special role as investors in infrastructure is not 
explicitly addressed.  
 
Summarising, the E-OCVM is particularly strong at addressing issue B, although 
parts of it are under development (particularly for safety and for human factors). 
Issue A is also addressed, but the coverage of issues C and D is not clear.  
 
4.2 INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
DESIGN 
In order to integrate safety in the design and construct of major projects (Stoop, 
2005) develops a new notion of systems engineering design and system 
architecture, which consists of three principal elements: (DCP). These elements 
can be interrelated along three dimensions: (1) a systems dimension, (2) a 
lifecycle dimension and (3) a design dimension. Together they constitute an 
integrated systems architecture prototype: the DCP diagram, Fig. 11.  
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The DCP diagram
Design Control
Life-cycle: coordination
design development construction operation modification
MACRO
MESO
MICRO
Practice
Systems-level:
integration
Design: innovation
Copyright: J.A. Stoop, 1996
GOAL
FUNCTION
FORM
 
Figure 11: Systems architecture model: The DCP diagram, from Stoop (2005). 
 
The systems dimension defines three levels: the Micro level of the user/operator, 
the Meso level of stakeholders’ organisation and operational control, and the 
Macro level of institutional conditions, i.e. the interactions between stakeholders’ 
organisations and operational control. At this dimension the issue of integration 
of administrative and emergency organisation across the various levels is crucial.  
 
The lifecycle dimension defines a series of subsequent phases, being design, 
development, construction, operation and modification. At this dimension, the 
coordination of decision making among actors across the phases is crucial.  
 
The design dimension identifies three principal phases in design, being goal 
(expressed by a program of requirements, concepts and principles), function 
(expressed by design alternatives) and form (expressed by detailed design 
complying with standards and norms). At this dimension, the potential of 
technical innovation for new safety solutions is crucial.  
 
The DCP model addresses the integration of complementary views (issue B in 
Section 3.6) by the inclusion of the levels Macro, Meso and Micro. In addition, the 
three DCP dimensions can be regarded as three complementary views, which are 
being coupled in one DCP diagram. Requirements joint validation (issue C) is 
addressed by the inclusion of and checking against “goal” at the Macro level. 
Multiple stakeholder roles (issue A) are addressed across all three DCP 
dimensions, starting during the Macro phase, and maintained later on. Policy 
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makers (issue D) are addressed as one of the stakeholders, but their special role 
is not explicitly acknowledged.  
 
Summarising: the DCP model addresses issues A, B, and C. Its strength is in 
identifying a Macro phase coupled to stakeholder joint goal setting at an early 
stage of the concept lifecycle. 
 
4.3 JOINT GOAL-ORIENTED SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
The introduction of goal-oriented safety management thinking by airlines, 
airports and ATM service providers may easily create an increasing tension 
between individual actors due to the desired evolution in goal-settings and 
operational solutions. In order not to jeopardise the valuable world-wide 
standardisation process, airlines, airports and ATM service providers should also 
be actively involved in the harmonised evolution of both individual and joint 
actor’s goals at the national, regional and international levels. This leads to an 
extension of the goal-oriented safety management to a Joint goal oriented safety 
management (Blom and Nijhuis, 2000), and is depicted in Fig. 12.  
 
Set actor  goals
C h eck  again st
actor /join t goals
D o to m eet p lan
Plan  to m eet goals
Feedback  to "A gree", 
"Set" an d "Plan "
A gree join t goal
settin gs
 
Figure 12: Integration of Safety Management processes in air transport is enabled by 
goal-setting co-ordination at national, regional and international levels, and by the 
exchange between collaborating actors of adequate safety feedback at all management 
levels (Blom and Nijhuis, 2000).  
 
The co-ordination between air transport operation directed stakeholders often 
starts at a national level and involves policy makers, regulators, airlines, airports 
and ATM service providers. The same variety of actors should also be involved at 
the regional and international levels, since pilots from various countries have to 
collaborate with controllers all over the world. The airlines, airports and ATM 
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service providers should collaborate on the joint identification of their actor 
goals under various operational concepts and against jointly elaborated high 
level objectives for various air transport demands and environments.  
 
Because the various stakeholders of the novel operational concept to be 
developed are all collaborating, a modern Safety Case per stakeholder does not 
suffice anymore. There also is need of a Joint Safety Case that should be 
produced with proper collaboration of all stakeholders (Blom and Nijhuis, 2000; 
Blom et al., 2000). As has been well explained in Hollnagel and Woods (2005) 
and Hollnagel et al. (2006), this should take into account organisational and joint 
cognitive systems aspects that influence safety of the operation. 
 
The Joint goal oriented safety management model addresses requirements joint 
validation (issue C in Section 3.6) by explicitly identifying the goal setting level 
plus feedback to it from check against joint goals. Multiple stakeholder roles 
(issue A) are addressed by means of the joint actors goal setting level plus 
feedback to it from check against joint goals. Policy makers (issue D) are only 
implicitly included as one of the stakeholders. The model does not explicitly 
integrate complementary views (issue B). 
 
Summarising, the Joint goal oriented safety management model addresses issues 
A and C. Its particular strength is in the step that the stakeholders need to 
develop their joint goal, which is updated after feedback from other steps. 
 
4.4 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
Following a recommendation in RAND (1993), an initial multi-stakeholder safety 
management approach has been established in 1995 by the Netherlands air 
transport sector. Recently, this platform of and for the sector to improve air 
transport safety (ground and flight safety) at and around Amsterdam airport 
structurally and collectively has been further improved (VpS ToR, 2006). The 
activities of this platform are aimed at the interfaces between business processes 
of the sector parties at the airside. Safety at these interfaces is seen as collective 
responsibility of the sector and as boundary condition for optimal and safe 
airport operations. Membership of this platform is mandatory for all businesses 
that execute safety-critical activities at Amsterdam airport. This is laid down in a 
‘Transactions Regulation’, which also commits members to have a form of Safety 
Management System, aimed at jointly managing safety (i.e. quality, risk, and 
incidents). 
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This multi-stakeholder safety management platform explicitly addresses multiple 
stakeholders roles (issue A in Section 3.6). The role of policy makers (issue D) is 
addressed implicitly. However, the platform addresses the operational phase 
only, not the design phase, hence the platform neither integrates complementary 
validation views (issue B) nor addresses requirements joint validation (issue C). 
Summarising, the Multi-stakeholder safety management model addresses issues 
A and D. Its strength is that it gives a particular view to the joint goal setting step 
of the Joint goal-oriented safety management model in Section 4.3, which makes 
it less generic. 
 
4.5 ROLES OF GOVERNMENT  
A picture that shows involvement of multiple stakeholder groups, including the 
government, as part of risk management is given in Rasmussen and Svedung 
(2000), see Fig. 13. It shows that there are close links and many nested levels of 
decision-making involved in risk management and regulatory rule-making to 
control hazardous processes. The challenge to a safety validation framework is 
to take all these issues into account in an integrated way. 
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Figure 13: This figure from Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) shows how many nested 
levels of decision-making are involved in risk management and regulatory rule making to 
control hazardous processes. This social organization is subject to severe environmental 
pressure in a dynamic, competitive society. Low risk operation depends on proper co-
ordination of decision making at all levels. However, each of the levels are often studied 
separately within different academic disciplines.  
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In the two models of Fig. 14, the government (ministries and national supervisory 
authority) is included in two different ways. The dashed box denotes a Project 
Development Office, which is made responsible for developing a novel 
operational concept and a corresponding Safety Case. The Safety Case is judged 
by the national supervisory authority. In the model on the left-hand-side, a 
Ministry directs a Project Development Office towards the commercial 
stakeholders. This Project Development Office acts as a commissioner/client on 
behalf of the Ministry; process integration is central. In the model on the right-
hand side, the Project Development Office sits around the commercial 
stakeholders.  
Commercial
Stakeholders
NSAMinistries
Project 
Development 
Office
Commercial
Stakeholders
Ministries NSA
Project 
Development
Office
 
Figure 14: Two models of possible government involvement in combination with a project 
development office.  
 
Variations of these models are possible, e.g. by taking into account a special role 
for an air navigation service provider as an independent governing body that is 
responsible for its own tasks, but that can also be regarded as part of the 
government. This represents the situation of the air navigation service provider 
in the Netherlands. 
 
The three models presented above address the role of policy makers (issue D in 
Section 3.6), and to some extent the issue of multiple stakeholder roles (issue A), 
but neither the integration of complementary views (issue B) nor the joint 
validation of requirements (issue C). 
 
Summarising, these models address issues A and D only. 
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4.6 SUMMARY AND USE OF STRONG POINTS OF THE VALIDATION 
MODELS IDENTIFIED 
Table 1 summarises whether the various models identified in this section give 
support to cover the issues A-D, for which none of the established validation 
views provides a good coverage during development process. In all cases, “Yes” 
means that this model addresses the issue; this does not imply a judgement of 
the extent to which the issue is addressed. An underlined Yes denotes which 
model addresses the issue best with emphasis on the early concept life cycle 
phases. 
 
Table 1: Support to coverage of open issues by models identified in Section 4. Yes 
denotes the issue is addressed; an underlined Yes denotes which model addresses the 
issue best; – denotes not addressed  
 A B C D 
 Multiple 
stakeholders 
roles 
Integrating 
complementary 
views 
Requirements 
joint 
validation 
Role of 
policy 
makers 
E-OCVM Yes Yes – – 
DCP model Yes Yes Yes – 
Joint goal-oriented safety 
management Yes – Yes – 
Multi-stakeholder safety 
management Yes – – Yes 
Roles of Government Yes – – Yes 
 
Table 1 shows that Issue A (multiple stakeholders roles) is addressed to some 
extent by all five models. However, when it comes to balancing the roles of these 
stakeholders, coverage is implicit for E-OCVM, Multi-stakeholder safety 
management, and Roles of government. Issue B (the integration of 
complementary views) is addressed by both E-OCVM and the DCP model. E-OCVM 
stands out by integrating different cases for various key areas, although these 
approaches are still under development. The DCP model and the Joint goal-
oriented safety management model clearly acknowledge the need to bring 
stakeholders together in balancing their goals and roles from an early stage, 
issue C. The latter emphasises the role of providing assessment feedback to the 
stakeholders. Finally, issue D (the role of policy makers) is addressed best by the 
Roles of government models and to some extent by Multi-stakeholder safety 
management, although the other models do implicitly acknowledge policy 
makers as one of the stakeholders. This opens the door for the government to 
additionally play a part in bringing the stakeholders together and encourage the 
joint goal setting.  
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5 INTEGRATION INTO SAFETY VALIDATION 
FRAMEWORK  
The aim of this section is to integrate the strong points of the established and 
novel validation views analysed in the previous sections. The integrated safety 
validation framework first addresses the Macro phase of an operation, during 
which multiple stakeholder roles need to be balanced, and in which a CONOPS 
(concept of operations) is agreed on (at some high level) by all stakeholders. In 
this Macro stage, the integration of validation views focuses on the multi-
stakeholder views of Section 4. Next, during the Meso and Micro phases, detailed 
operational scenarios describing procedures, working practices and system 
specifications will have to be developed to enable CONOPS implementation. In 
these Meso and Micro phases, the established validation views come in focus. 
Fig. 15 shows that the Macro phase roughly corresponds with phases V0-V3 of 
the E-OCVM, and the Meso phase runs from V4.  
 
V1   V2   V3   V0   V4   V5   
Needs Scope Feasibility Integration Pre-Operational Operational
MACRO MESO  
Figure 15: Coupling of phases V0-V5 to phases Macro and Meso. 
 
5.1 APPROACH TO COMBINING STRONG POINTS OF VALIDATION 
VIEWS 
Section 4.6 showed that when it comes to insight into the extent to which 
multiple stakeholders need to balance their roles (issue A in Section 3.6), the 
DCP model provides the best view. The DCP’s systems dimension (vertical axis) 
defines three levels: Macro (institutional conditions), Meso (organisation and 
operational control) and Micro (user/operator). The need to jointly balance 
stakeholder roles is largest at the Macro level. At the design dimension (diagonal 
axis) in the DCP model, the Macro level is coupled to a Joint Goal setting, which 
provides the link with issues A and C in Section 3.6, which is explained further 
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below. Hence in order to address these issues A and C, we need to particularly 
focus on the Macro level first.  
The lifecycle dimension (horizontal axis) of the DCP model is also adopted by the 
E-OCVM, hence this will be another important dimension to cover. However, it 
appears that the lifecycle phases in the E-OCVM and the phases in the DCP model 
are not aligned. In order to make effective use of European standardisation 
developments, the best option appears to be to adopt the phases of the E-OCVM 
concept lifecycle view. 
 
A closer look reveals that the Macro phase of the DCP covers roughly lifecycle 
phases V0 through V3 of the E-OCVM. The follow-up lifecycle Meso phase of DCP 
covers roughly lifecycle phases V4 and V5, see Fig. 15. A key output of the Macro 
phase consists of jointly validated requirements for different stakeholder types 
as input to the Meso phase. 
 
Section 4 also showed that Requirements joint validation (issue C in Section 3.6) 
is addressed by two of the models, i.e. DCP model and Joint goal-oriented safety 
management. A key common aspect of these models is that stakeholder joint 
goal-setting takes place at an early stage in concept design. In addition, 
regarding the multiple stakeholder roles (issue A), the DCP model and the Joint 
goal-oriented safety management model clearly acknowledge the need to bring 
stakeholders together and balance their goals and roles from an early stage. In 
particular for safety, at the Macro level, the Joint goal-oriented safety 
management view provides four types of activities: 
(1). ‘Joint goal setting’,  
(2). ‘Plan’ (CONOPS development),  
(3). ‘Do’ (what does this mean per stakeholder), and  
(4). ‘Check’ (validation).  
This reveals that there are four main processes to consider, which are referred to 
as Joint Goal setting, CONOPS development, Stakeholder allocations, and Joint 
safety validation, see Fig. 16. Obviously, as depicted in Fig. 16, several 
interactions exist between these four processes. In addition, as shown above, 
since CONOPS development will be conducted in several lifecycle phases, each of 
these four main processes will have to be synchronised with such lifecycle 
phases and with each other. In particular, as argued above, these phases are to 
be in line with the E-OCVM concept lifecycle view, which consists of six phases 
V0 through V5. The synchronisation compares and integrates the results of the 
four main processes in each phase, so that an effective start is made with the 
next phase.  
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At the Meso phase, which starts around lifecycle phase V3-V4 (see Fig. 15), the 
Joint goal setting and the Stakeholder allocation processes become of a more 
passive nature, and the CONOPS development and Safety validations are conducted 
at the level of individual stakeholders. Therefore, in this phase, the established 
validation views of Section 3, i.e. the V-model, the Spiral model, etc., are of 
particular use. These established views take the jointly validated requirements 
developed in the Macro phase as a starting point and develop a more detailed 
design of the operation. It is noted that if the Meso phase starts too early, then 
the requirements that come out of the Macro phase may not have converged yet.  
 
The E-OCVM also provides support to the integration with other assessments 
(issue B in Section 3.6), by means of its link between the Safety validation 
process and all non-safety validations (Economy, Environment, etc). It is noted 
that for the earlier phases this support is still under development. 
 
Note that for a proper balancing of stakeholder joint goals at the Macro level we 
need to structure by means of a joint entity, which we refer to as Project 
Development Office (see dashed box in roles of government views, Section 4.4). 
This means that a Multi-actor safety management organisation like the one 
described in Section 4.3 should extend its scope and activities to the pre-
operational lifecycle phases. This addresses issue D in Section 3.6. 
 
Joint Goal 
settings
Stakeholder
allocations
CONOPS
development
Joint
safety 
validation
 
Figure 16: SAFMAC proposed safety validation framework, in which four main 
‘processes’ Joint Goal setting, CONOPS development, Joint safety validation, and 
Stakeholder allocations are elaborated through a spiral development approach.  
  
 
 
 
32 NLR-TP-2008-425 January 2009  
 
The following subsections outline the four major processes depicted in Fig. 16 in 
more detail. 
5.2 JOINT GOAL SETTING 
The development of major changes in air transport operations comprises a 
complex and lengthy process managed by international organisations, such as 
ICAO, that require agreement by a significant number of parties at the 
international level. These major changes do not form an issue that European 
regulators and air navigation service providers can attempt in isolation, and they 
will require significant international co-ordination and co-operation. In addition, 
each of the stakeholders will have their own requirements, wishes and needs, 
which can be formulated as goals. The process of obtaining consensus about the 
joint goals of the different stakeholders will be a driver of the major change in air 
transport operations, and will be described here as a goal setting process. To 
accomplish this, the problem can be decomposed into a hierarchy of sub-
problems each of which could be analysed without the need to solve the next 
sub-problem. The solution of each of these sub-problems can only be addressed 
through an explicit involvement of experts in advanced operational concepts and 
safety experts. A general goal setting process starts with the identification of a 
high-level goal, after which this high-level goal is further specified into elements 
that explain what the high-level goal means for the different actors involved.  
 
5.3 CONOPS DEVELOPMENT 
The CONOPS development phases will be based on general practices of CONOPS 
development by major European players in the field, and should fit with the Joint 
Goal setting phases of the previous subsection. The phases of the CONOPS 
development process associated to major changes in air transport operations 
should be in line with the E-OCVM concept lifecycle view. The phases that fall in 
the Macro view identify the reasons for initiating the required changes to the 
operational concept as well as the evidence that the initial concept makes sense 
for all parties involved. The potential solutions and their enablers and/or 
concepts have been identified. The potential solutions identified are combined to 
form a high-level CONOPS. 
 
During the CONOPS development process new insights are inevitable and may 
result in changing operational environment or alternative solutions, which in turn 
may lead to small or large modifications of the way the concept is organised. The 
development process as a whole is therefore highly iterative. 
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5.4 JOINT SAFETY VALIDATION 
Airlines provide safety critical services directly to their passengers and thus to 
human society. For the safety of their flights, airlines critically depend of services 
by other service providers, such as air navigation service providers and airports. 
Whereas a Modern Safety Case is built by individual service providers, a Joint 
Safety Case is built by collaborating stakeholders. The Joint Safety Case should 
provide the high level argumentation and evidence for the total operation, while 
each Modern Safety Case should provide the evidence and the high level 
argumentation for that part of the operation that falls under the responsibility of 
one specific service provider. For the Joint Safety Case there are multiple 
approaches to setting up a useful high level argumentation. Three hypothetical 
approaches are:  
• Hierarchical approach, in which the Joint Safety Case is being built first. On 
the basis of such a Joint Safety Case, the requirements to be fulfilled by each 
of the stakeholders involved can be identified. Subsequently, each of these 
stakeholders has to develop a Modern Safety Case to show that the 
requirements, posed by the Joint Safety Case on his own operation, are 
satisfied.  
• Negotiation approach, in which a Joint Safety Case and generic versions of 
Modern Safety Cases are being built in parallel in a spiral development 
process, and with proper exchange between the two processes. If there are 
gaps and/or overlap between the various resulting generic Modern Safety 
Cases and the Joint Safety Case, then through negotiations between the 
collaborating stakeholders adequate improvements should be identified.   
• Integration approach. This approach means that the generic Modern Safety 
Cases are being built first. Next, a Joint Safety Case is being built through 
integration of the material available from the generic Modern Safety Cases. 
The problem with this approach is that risky combinations of hazards do not 
show up in an early phase, and that it easily leads to a Babylonia building. 
The hierarchical approach is in theory the preferred one but the negotiation 
approach may be more practical. Because there is little experience in developing 
a Joint Safety Case, the best practice remains to be developed. Obviously, it is up 
to the collaborating stakeholders to choose the approach that is judged to be 
most effective in realising their collaboration objective. The implications of the 
Joint Safety Case considering the complete operation, including all commercial 
actors involved, can best be explained in terms of the Modern Safety Case 
contents as depicted in Fig. 9: 
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The operation: The Joint Safety Case considers the total operation, while each 
Modern Safety Case considers that part of an operation that concerns a particular 
actor only. This implicitly means that Modern Safety Cases often go into more 
detail than the Joint Safety Case, while the Joint Safety Case should explicitly 
cover issues like responsibilities and accountabilities of the various stakeholders, 
including the interfaces/boundaries between them. In order to prevent any 
confusion, in particular for hazardous situations, it is necessary that all Safety 
Cases refer to the same description of the advanced operation. 
 
Applicable standards: A Joint Safety Case should maintain a joint listing of all 
applicable (international and national) standards, while each Modern Safety Case 
should receive a copy of this, and should contribute to the completion of the 
joint listing.  
 
Safety Management: Each Modern Safety Case relies on the Safety Management of 
its responsible stakeholder. A Joint Safety Case relies on how Safety Management 
responsibility and co-ordination is arranged for the total operation under 
consideration.  
 
Hazards register: Since hazards that start under the responsibility of one 
stakeholder often affect the operation of another stakeholder, it is very important 
that a Joint Safety Case makes a joint hazard register which is as complete as is 
possible, while each Modern Safety Case has a copy of this joint hazard register. 
This also means that hazard identification and development of safety 
improvement measures per hazard should be done both at the level of a Joint 
Safety Case, and at the level of each Modern Safety Case. 
 
Safety assessment: The Joint Safety Case should assess the safety of the 
complete operation, while each Modern Safety Case should assess the safety of 
that part of the operation that falls under the responsibility of the particular 
stakeholder. In effect this often means that within a Joint Safety Case it is 
necessary to perform a safety assessment for the operation, while within a 
Modern Safety Case the aim is to perform a safety assessment for the 
contribution by a single stakeholder. Any assumptions about the operation that 
have been made during the assessment should be clearly stated and justified; 
however obvious these assumptions may be, the implications for others involved 
with the project cannot always be predicted. 
 
Supporting evidence: A Modern Safety Case may provide safety supporting 
evidence for the Joint Safety Case. A Joint Safety Case, however, may only provide 
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supporting evidence for a Modern Safety Case if it is shown that this does not 
lead to a vicious circle. For procured equipment, a manufacturer’s Safety Case 
may form supporting evidence both for a Modern Safety Case and for a Joint 
Safety Case.  
 
Similar as applies to a Modern Safety Case, a Joint Safety Case must be developed 
in a way that allows for modifications, extensions or revisions, making them 
living documents that can be updated when, for example, new hazards have 
been identified and assessed during the development of the new or changed 
operation. 
 
5.5 STAKEHOLDER ALLOCATIONS 
At each phase of the development of a CONOPS, it is essential to have a translation 
of what the development means for the individual stakeholders, in order to get 
their involvement and approval at an early stage. Here, the Macro phase (roughly 
from V0 to V3) provides requirements for stakeholders, which are to be used as a 
starting point for the Meso phase (from V4 onwards). In fact, this comes down to 
an allocation per phase of responsibilities, functionalities, information flows and 
system functions of the future concept per individual stakeholder, in addition to 
an allocation of safety validation activities. This allocation should stimulate an 
early start of the development work at Meso level by each of the stakeholders. At 
the Meso level (i.e. from phase V4 onwards), a CONOPS description needs to be 
worked out in more detail. 
 
6 ELABORATION OF SAFMAC FRAMEWORK 
PROCESSES 
The final step is to couple the four ‘processes’ outlined in the previous 
subsections, through a spiral development approach, so that they form one 
framework process along the E-OCVM phases V0 through V5 (Section 4.1). In 
addition to the synchronisation after each phase that should take place, there are 
boundary conditions, e.g. foreign influences, and other influences, like those 
from government/regulator. But although there may also be several iterations 
across the different phases, there is a red thread that runs through the first 
phases (in parallel or in an undecided order) of the four processes Joint goal 
setting, CONOPS development, Joint safety validation, and Stakeholder allocations, 
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after which a synchronisation takes place, and after which the red thread 
proceeds with the next phase of Joint goals setting, CONOPS development, etc. 
In Tables 2–5, the four processes are outlined for E-OCVM phases V0-V3, which 
focus on the Macro phases. For phases V4, V5 and beyond, the established 
validation views provide further detail. 
 
Table 2 Joint goal setting in phases V0-V3 
Phase Joint goal setting 
V0 –  
Needs 
The high-level joint goal is identified, including boundary conditions. The 
high-level joint goal should at least discuss goals for the ICAO Key 
Performance Areas from ICAO (ICAO Doc 9854) 
V1 –  
Scope 
The high-level joint goal is further detailed and specified to direct a CONOPS 
development that takes place in this phase, or where necessary corrected. 
This includes at least identification of requirements, of the roles of the 
human actors, and of the technology needs. 
V2 –  
Feasibility 
The high-level joint goal is further detailed and specified to direct a CONOPS 
development that takes place in this phase. 
V3 –  
Integration 
The agreed joint goals are revisited and verified, and where necessary 
further detailed, adapted or corrected, and next agreed upon. 
 
Table 3: Table 3: CONOPS development in phases V0-V3  
Phase CONOPS development 
V0 –  
Needs 
The barriers in reaching the high-level joint goal are identified. To complete 
the validation of the concept in later phases, the concept must show that it 
can alleviate these barriers enough thus enhancing performance to the 
anticipated required level. Also, the operational environment is determined. 
V1 –  
Scope 
The concept is described in sufficient detail to enable identification of the 
potential benefits mechanism (i.e. the change to systems and/or operations 
that will enable a known barrier to be alleviated). Some aspects of the 
concept will be unknown or unclear at this stage. They may exist as a 
number of options to be assessed during the further validation process. 
This stage should lead to one or more High-Level CONOPSes, which can be 
further analyzed and refined later. 
V2 –  
Feasibility 
The concept is developed and explored until it can be considered 
operationally feasible. Prototypes will be used that make assumptions 
about technical aspects in order to avoid system engineering which can be 
costly and lengthy. Aspects that are focused on are operability and the 
acceptability of operational aspects. Operational procedures and 
requirements become stable. HMI, Operating procedures (for normal and 
key non-normal conditions) and phraseology become clear.  
V3 –  
Integration 
The concept is further developed, enabling identifying in more detail the 
performance in the concept of operation. Stakeholders further develop their 
part of the operation as part of their stakeholder allocations, without losing 
the view on the integrated operation. Required functionality is integrated 
into pre-industrial prototypes. Engineering processes are explored to 
provide experience that will be useful to building the end-system. Realistic 
scenarios that are representative of what the concept must be able to 
manage in the target end-system. The focus is on system level behaviour, 
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performance and establishment of standards/regulations necessary to build 
and operate the required technical infrastructure.  
 
Table 4 Joint safety validation in phases V0-V3 
Phase Joint safety validation 
V0 –  
Needs 
In this phase the high-level joint goal and the barriers need to be 
understood. For safety validation, this means that the safety aspects of the 
high-level joint goal and barriers must be understood. Thus, it is 
investigated what the goal is with respect to safety, and what the applicable 
safety regulations and safety criteria are. Furthermore, it is analyzed 
whether the current operation meets the goal, and if it does not, why this is 
not the case.  
V1 –  
Scope 
In this phase potentially many concept ideas are identified in the CONOPS 
development process. Only the most promising of those ideas should be 
further developed. The ideas are still described on a high-level. For safety 
validation, this means that involvement should be focused on giving 
feedback on which ideas are most promising from a safety point-of-view. 
This is best done by analyzing the concept ideas, and feeding back to the 
CONOPS development the main safety issues with respect to each concept 
idea.  
V2 –  
Feasibility 
In this phase it is to be analyzed whether the concept is feasible. For safety 
validation this means that one should become reasonably sure that all risks 
of the concept are tolerable with respect to the joint goal and thus the 
safety criteria selected. Hence, all risks should be identified and assessed, 
and realistic (attainable) risk mitigations should be identified which should 
ensure the risk to stay tolerable. After this step, it should be reasonably 
sure that the concept can be implemented safely. More detailed 
justification may follow later however. To evaluate the feasibility of the 
concept, the full scope of the concept should be considered, and hence all 
stakeholders should agree on their part of a CONOPS, and the performance 
of their part. 
V3 –  
Integration 
In this phase, a more detailed concept comes available, and more evidence 
is gathered for the performance of the integrated concept. For safety 
validation the risk mitigations are validated: evidence is gathered that they 
are indeed sufficient to have a concept that complies with the need and 
safety criteria, and it is analyzed whether the risk mitigations are indeed 
achievable. 
 
Table 5: Stakeholder allocations in phases V0-V3  
Phase Stakeholder allocations 
V0 –  
Needs 
The individual performance needs and barriers per stakeholder are 
identified, and if needed corrected.  
V1 – 
 Scope 
The concept that enables identification of the potential benefits mechanism 
is translated to what this means to the individual stakeholders in order to 
get their approval and involvement at an early stage. This may include 
identification of potential sub-solutions, and eventually lead to a sub High-
Level CONOPS (that is, the stakeholder-specific part of the High-Level CONOPS). 
V2 –  
Feasibility 
The feasible CONOPS is translated to what this means to the individual 
stakeholders in order to get their approval and involvement at an early 
stage. 
  
 
 
 
38 NLR-TP-2008-425 January 2009  
 
V3 – 
 Integration 
The agreed stakeholder allocations take place, and it is verified whether 
they constitute a CONOPS developed in V3. Where necessary, the stakeholder 
allocations are further detailed, adapted or corrected, and agreed upon. 
It should be noted that synchronization of the four major processes does not 
need to be restricted to the moments on which a phase of the Concept Lifecycle 
Model ends and may be recommendable within certain phases. In addition, the 
phases described above are expected to have potential for further improvements 
due to increasing experiences in safety validation. In the early phases of the 
development of an advanced operational concept, the SAFMAC main processes 
joint goal setting, stakeholder allocation, and joint safety validation have an 
active character: the joint goal is further specified, each time new stakeholder 
allocations are agreed upon, and the safety validation activities are further 
deepened. Once an operationally feasible CONOPS has been developed, validated 
and agreed upon, including stakeholder allocations, it could be sufficient to 
revisit the joint goal, the stakeholder allocations and the safety validation, to 
check whether everything is still correct, in place, and in coherence. Here, the 
character of these three processes may become more passive.  
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this paper was to study the needs for safety validation of multi-
stakeholder changes in air transport operations, i.e. changes which particularly 
require the balancing of the roles and responsibilities of multiple stakeholders. 
Through a process of analysis, evaluation, review and consolidation, including an 
alignment with important European developments in the field (specifically E-
OCVM), this paper developed a safety validation framework that consists of four 
processes: Joint goal setting by all stakeholders; CONOPS development; Joint safety 
validation process; Allocation of responsibilities and requirements (possibly 
including functionalities and information flow developments and validation 
responsibilities), to appropriate individual stakeholders. The framework is 
referred to as SAFMAC (SAFety validation of MAjor Changes).  
 
In order to further these results, the SAFMAC developments will be focused along 
two tracks: a policy track, and a follow-up study track. The policy track aims for 
obtaining further acceptance, nationally, within Europe, within the USA, and 
within ICAO.  
 
The main issues to be addressed in the follow-up study track are: 
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• Further clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders 
within the process of developing a safety validated CONOPS. In particular, 
attention should be paid to the role of the regulator and the supervisory 
authorities, including the need for missing regulations.  
• Development of a set of safety validation quality indicators (Everdij and Blom, 
2007). 
• Embedding of safety methods (see e.g. Safety Methods Database (2008)), into 
the safety validation process, and further development of safety validation 
process, including mapping to the individual stakeholders. 
• Application of the framework to one or more interesting (national) major 
changes in air transport operations.  
 
A first national application has been started for a project on merging civil and 
military airspace management. The early experience in this project already shows 
that thinking about joint goal setting works remarkably refreshingly for the 
participating stakeholders and causes them to look beyond their own familiar 
contexts. 
 
Ongoing developments regarding the identified validation views and newly 
emerging validation views will be considered in the further SAFMAC development 
as well. 
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ACRONYMS 
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practices 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
CAVA Concerted Action on Validation of Air traffic management 
systems 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
DCP Design, Control and Practice 
DGLM Directorate-General Civil Aviation and Maritime Affairs 
EFQM European Foundation of Quality Management 
E-OCVM European operational concept validation methodology 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
MAEVA Master Air traffic management European Validation plan 
M-MIS Man-Machine Interface System 
QSA Quality and Safety Systems in Aviation 
R&D Research and Development 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAFMAC SAFety validation of MAjor Changes 
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research 
ToR Terms of Reference 
TQM Total Quality Management 
TQSM Total Quality and Safety Management 
VAPORETO Validation Process for Overall Requirements in Air transport 
operations 
VpS Veiligheids Platform Schiphol 
 
